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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Raymond Scott Peck (herein after Peck) appeals from the District Court's
decision upon judicial review affirming the order of the Idaho Transportation Department
(hereinafter lTD) which disqualified Peck's commercial driver's license endorsement.
B. Course of Proceedings

ITD agrees with the "Course of Proceedings" as described in the brief filed by the
Appellant.

II.
FACTS OF THE FACTS
On December 2,2009, Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence Bonner
County, Idaho. R. p 14.

Because the BAC results showed a violation of Idaho Code

Section 18-8004 the officer issued Peck a notice of suspension of his driver's license and
a temporary non-commercial driving permit. See Peck v. lTD, 153 Idaho 37, 278 P.3d
439 (Idaho App 2012). Peck challenged the administrative license suspension (ALS) to
the Idaho Court of Appeals. 1d.

The Idaho Court of Appeals issued its decision

upholding the administrative license suspension on April 30, 2012. ld.
On December 15, 2009, the Department mailed Peck a Notice of Disqualification
(Notice) because the Department's records show that Peck had failed an evidentiary test
for driving under the influence. Clerk's Record, page 1. The Notice stated, in part, that
the Department was "withdrawing your driving privileges to operate a commercial
vehicle for 365 days ... " The Notice also invited Peck to request an administrative hearing
to contest the action by the Department. ld.

1

On December 30, 2009, Peck, through his attorney requested a hearing on the
CDL disqualification. R.,p.2. On March 1,2012 Peck also filed a Petition for Stay in Re:
CDL Disqualification and proposed Order for a stay in the CDL disqualification..
The administrative hearing on the CDL disqualification was held May 15,2012
before hearing officer Michael Howell. At the hearing, the petitioner testified that he was
not advised of the consequences to his CDL if he took and failed a BAC test. See T., p.
4-6. Peck argued that the CDL disqualification was not proper because the petitioner was
not advised of the potential consequences to his CDL if he took and failed the BAC
testing. Id., p. 6-16. On May 18, 2012 the hearing officer issued his decision, in which he
upheld the CDL disqualification for one year. In his decision, the hearing officer
correctly wrote and held, in part:

III.

Idaho Code Section 18-8002A provides for the penalties associated with the
failure of a blood test but is not intended to be all inclusive of all consequences
that may result from an arrest for driving under the influence or for the failure of a
blood alcohol test. The Idaho Code and the regulations of the Department of
Transportation contain other civil consequences for such action.
VI.
The disqualification of the driver's commercial driving privileges is a
consequence unique to commercial drivers that resulted from his failure of the
breath test and is in addition to any consequences contained in Idaho Code
Section 18-8002A.
VII

The Administrative License Suspension proceedings as set forth in Idaho Code,
Section 49-8002A 1 are separated and distinct from and not relevant to the
disqualification of commercial driving privileges except the result form the basis
ofthe disqualification in this matter.
VIII

The requirement of notice and the procedure set forth in Idaho Code Section 188002A are not affected by or modified by Idaho Code, Section 49-335(2), and
there is no additional notice requirement to the statutory notices set forth in

I

This is an obvious typographical error and should be cited as 18-8002A.
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Section 18-8002A as a result of the additional consequences for commercial
drivers in Section 49-335(2).
IX.
Idaho Code, Section 49-335 was modified by the state legislature to subject a
commercial driver to a disqualification for any conviction of driving under the
influence, whether driving a commercial vehicle or not, effective July 1, 2005.
X.
The modification of Idaho Code, Section 49-335 was effective prior to the
driver's arrest for driving under the influence, giving him statutory notice of the
additional possible consequence prior to his actions which resulted in his
conviction and prior to this actual conviction.
XI
The driver argued that the disqualification of his commercial driving privileges
pursuant to I.C. Section 49-335(1)(a) is unconstitutional. The very issue of the
notice the driver claimed was lacking and a violation of his constitutional rights
was specifically addressed by the Court of Appeals in Mr. Peck's appeal to the
court. The court stated:
Neither section 18-8002A nor due process requires an officer to inform a
person subject to license suspension of the consequences regarding a
separate disqualification under section 49-335(2). The notice of
consequences contained in section 18-8002A (and reflected in the
advisory form) is not deficient simply because it did not inform Peck of
consequences under a different statute. See Buell v. Idaho Dep't of
Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 264, 254 P.3d 1253, 1260 (Ct.App.2011) (holding
a person with a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws
governing CDLs, and therefore, Buell " was presumed to know that the
disqualification of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received
under [Title 18]" ); Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512,516,65 P.3d 534,
538 (Ct.App.2003) (rejecting an argument that the police officer was
obligated to give a driver advice regarding all consequences of taking a
breath test, not just those delineated in section 18-8002A). Therefore,
Peck's due process rights were not violated. Peck v. State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation, Court of Appeal 2012 Opinion No. 25, at p.
6.

R., p. 16-19. On June 5, 2012 Peck filed a Petition for Judicial Review. The appeal was
heard by the Honorable Jeff Brudie. On February 4, 2013, Judge Brudie correctly upheld
the action ofITD and affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. R. p. 117.

III.

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISSUES

The issues on appeal are stated as follows:
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1. Did the Notice of Suspension violate Peck's right to procedural due process
because it did not inform Peck of the requirements of Idaho Code Section 49335(2)?
2. Did the disqualification of a Commercial Driver's License violate Peck's right
to substantive due process because he was not operating a commercial vehicle
at the time of his arrest?
3. Is Peck entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

IV.
ARGUMENT

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
In this appeal the burden of proof is on Peck. In order to vacate or remand the
decision of the hearing officer, Peck must establish that the decision of the hearing officer
was: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.
Generally, in a Petition for Judicial Review, the court reviews the agency's
underlying decision. The scope of review is such that "[t]he court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."
Idaho Code Section 67-5279. The scope of review is such that this Court must uphold the
hearing officer's conclusions of law unless those conclusions of law fall within the
enumerated violations set forth in Idaho Code Section 67-5379 (3) (a-e).
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The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's
driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201,49-330,67-5201(2),67-5270 and In re Suspension of
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). In an appeal
from the decision ofthe district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall
v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct.App.2002). This
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex reI. Bd. of Comm 's, 134
Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. I.e. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. of County

5

Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). lfthe agency's decision is not
affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as
necessary."

I.e.

§ 67-5279(3).

B. IDAHO LAW AND FEDERAL LAW
Generally, Idaho Code § 18-8002A prescribes the penalties governing all aspects
of a motorist's driving privileges in the event that the motorist submits to, but fails,
evidentiary testing. I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a). The suspension is imposed by ITD and the
statute provides for administrative review of the suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(4), (7).
This is commonly referred to as an Administrative License Suspension (ALS).
Idaho's motor vehicle code prescribes additional consequences which result from
a motorist's refusal to submit to evidentiary testing or failing such testing. On July 1,
2007 Idaho Code Section 49-335 was modified to subject a driver with a CDL to
disqualification if the driver fails a test for alcohol whether the person is operating a
commercial vehicle or not. These additional consequences solely relate to the ability to
operate commercial vehicles pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335(2). This is commonly
known as a CDL disqualification.
The disqualification of Peck's CDL was pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335. Idaho
Code § 49-335 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(1) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A,
B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle
for a period of not less than one (1) year if convicted in the form of a judgment or
withheld judgment of a first violation under any state or federal law of:
(a) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance;
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***
(2) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A,
B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle
for a period of not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or
submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other
intoxicating substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle.

***
(4) A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 383 if
found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in
subsection (1) or (2) ofthis section, or any combination of those offenses, arising
from two (2) or more separate incidents. [emphasis added].

In 1999, Congress passed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act,
which included provisions requiring that the holder of a CDL be prohibited from driving
a commercial motor vehicle if he or she has been convicted of certain violations of a
state's motor vehicle laws. 49 C.F.R. § 383.51 identifies the offenses that "disqualify" the
holder of a CDL from driving a commercial motor vehicle. A state that fails to comply
with this federal mandate risks losing federal highway funds. Pursuant to 49 CFR 383.51
of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration a first incident required that the
holder of CDL must be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one
year. A copy of 49 CRF 383.51 is attached as Exhibit 1. Therefore, the disqualification
of Peck's CDL is required by both Idaho State Law and Federal Regulation.

C. SUSTANTIVE AND PROCEDUREAL DUE PROCESS

7

Peck argues that his right to procedure and/or substantive due process was
violated by the CDL disqualification at issue in this matter. 2 Petitioner's argument is
without legal or factual basis.
In the prior ALS appeal, Peck argued that due process was violated due to defects
in the notice given to Peck prior to the evidentiary testing. Peck v. lTD, 153 Idaho 37,
278 P.3d 439 eCt. App. 2012) footnote 2. In that case, the Court of Appeals explained the
difference between substantive due process and procedural due process. Id. Substantive
due process means that the reason for depriving the driver's license cannot be arbitrary.
Id. A challenge to the license suspension procedure and advisory is a procedural due

process claim. Id.
1.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
THE PROCEDURE AND THE ADVISORY ARE LAWFUL

Peck argued that the advisory given to him failed to adequately advise him of all
his rights, and it therefore constitutionally defective. As discussed below, this argument
lacks merit.
Issues regarding the constitutionality of a CDL disqualification were brought to
the Idaho Court of Appeals recently in Buell v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 151
Idaho 257 eCt. App. 2011). Buell first argued that the CDL disqualification violated the
principles of double jeopardy. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Buell then argued that his due process rights were violated because I.e. §§ 18-8002,
18-8002A, and 49-335 are ambiguous and did not adequately notify him of when his

2 Peck does not distinguish whether he argues a violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution or Idaho Constitution; however, the due process guarantees in each are substantially the same.
See Peck v lTD, 153 Idaho 37, 278 P.3d 439 (Ct. App. 2012) at footnote 2.
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CDL disqualification would begin. The Court of Appeals also rejected this argument,
stating:

Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A are part of the criminal code. Idaho
Code Section 18-8002 provides for suspension of a noncommercial driver's
license when a driver has refused to submit to an evidentiary BAC test. Idaho
Code Section 18-8002A provides for the suspension of a driver's license when a
driver has failed an evidentiary BAC test. The motor vehicle code prescribes
additional consequences that result from a motorist's refusal to submit to
evidentiary testing or for failing such testing. I.C. § 49-335. Idaho Code Section
49-335(1)(a) provides that a CDL holder will be disqualified from operating a
commercial vehicle for one year if convicted of driving under the influence. Idaho
Code Section 49-335(2) provides that a CDL holder will be disqualified from
operating a commercial vehicle for one year if the person refuses to submit to or
fails a BAC evidentiary test. A disqualification under I.C. § 49-335 is in addition
to a suspension under I.e. §§ 18-8002 or 18-8002A and relates solely to the
driver's CDL. A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws
governing CDLs. See Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211
(Ct.App.2000). Therefore, Buell was presumed to know that the disqualification
of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received under either I.C. §§
18-8002 or 18-8002A.
Id. Likewise, in this case, CDL drivers, like the petitioner, are presumed to know that the

disqualification of his CDL was an additional penalty to him for failing a BAC test.
Additional issues regarding the constitutionality of Idaho CDL disqualification
were brought before the Idaho Court Appeals in Williams v. Idaho Department of
Transportation, 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (CL App. 2012). In Williams, the

petitioner was contesting a hearing officer's decision to disqualify Williams for life from
holding a CDL because of a second conviction for driving under the influence. Williams
raised several constitutional arguments against the action by lTD. Williams argued that
his due process rights were violated because he was not notified that his CDL would be
suspended if took and failed the BAC test. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
The Court first outlined the burden of proof and stated:
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Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review the lower court's
determination de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126,131
(2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 218 P.3d 10,13 (Ct. App. 2009). The
party attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong
presumption of validity. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711,69 P.3d at 131; Martin, 148
Idaho at 34,218 P.3d at 13. Appellate courts are obligated to seek an
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Korsen, 138 Idaho at
711,69 P.3d at 131; Martin, 148 Idaho at 34,218 P.3d at 13.
The Court of Appeals continued, addressing the petitioner's argument:
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied
to a complainant'S conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148
Idaho at 35,218 P.3d at 14. Here, Williams does not make a facial challenge, but
contends only that the statute is impermissibly vague as applied to him. To
succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that
the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct was
prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled
discretion in determining whether to charge the complainant. Martin, 148 Idaho at
35,218 P.3d at 14.
Williams argues that he was not adequately notified of the consequences of
submitting to the tests as required by I.C. § 18-8002. In denying Williams' claim
that the statute was void for vagueness, the district court stated:
This issue was recently addressed, in part, by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Wanner v. lTD, 150 Idaho 164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011), wherein the Idaho
Supreme Court held that a § 18-8002A suspension governs driving
privileges in toto, while an I.C. § 49-335 suspension applies to a particular
subset of driving privileges, i.e. the right to operate a commercial vehicle.
Further the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a similar argument in Buell,
supra. There, Buell argued that his due process rights were violated
because I.C. §§ 18-8002, 18-8002A, and 49-335 are ambiguous and did
not adequately notify him of when his CDL disqualification would begin.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that I.C. §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A are
criminal statutes and address suspension of non-commercial licenses.
Further, I.C. § 49-335 prescribes additional consequences that result from
a motorist's refusal to take or the failure of an evidentiary test. The Buell
court held that a disqualification under I.C. § 49-335 is in addition to a
suspension under I. C. § § 8002 and 8002A.
A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws governing
CDLs. Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Ct. App.
2000). Williams argues that at no time was he informed that his CDL
would be suspended for his lifetime if he failed the breath testing. The
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record shows that Williams was provided the required notifications as
required by 1. e. § 18-8002A.
Williams was presumed to know that the disqualification of his CDL was
in addition to any suspensions he received under I.e. §§ 18-8002 or 188002A. Williams was also presumed to know the consequences ifhe was
convicted of any of the offenses listed in I.C. § 49-335(1) or refused to
submit to or failed an evidentiary test pursuant to I.C. § 49-335(2). He was
also presumed to know that his CDL would be suspended for life for two
or more major events as specified in I.C. § 49-335(1) or (2).
This Court finds that I.C. §§ 18-8002, 18-8002A and 49-335 are not void
for vagueness. There is no legal requirement that an arresting officer
provide notice of all the collateral effects that a breath test failure will
have on one's CDL endorsement. As a holder of a CDL, Williams was
presumed to have such knowledge.

In this case, there was no violation of Peck's right to procedural due process.
Peck argues that the Notice of Suspension was not adequate because it failed to inform
him of the provisions and consequences ofIdaho Code § 49-335(2). Peck does not argue
that he did not receive the admonitions required by Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 188002A. Instead, he invites this Court to add language to those code sections by including
other consequences to the Suspension Advisory form. This Court should decline the
invitation. Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single
consequence of the failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and
18-8002A do not require law enforcement officers to inform drivers of every potential
consequence of failing the evidentiary test. In fact, in Peck v. lTD, the Idaho Court of
Appeals held:
In regards to whether Peck was afforded procedural due process relating to his
license suspension by the notice actually given, Peck does not argue the notice of
suspension advisory form was ambiguous or did not completely advise him of his
rights and duties under section 18-8002A. In fact, the advisory form specifically
provided all information required by section 18-8002A and gave him notice of the
license suspension and the procedures afforded to him to challenge it. Neither
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section 18-8002A nor due process requires an officer to inform a person subject to
license suspension of the consequences regarding a separate disqualification
under section 49-335(2). The notice of consequences contained in section 188002A (and reflected in the advisory form) is not deficient simply because it did
not inform Peck of consequences under a different statute. See Buell v. Idaho
Dep't of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 264, 254 P.3d 1253, 1260 (Ct.App.2011)
(holding a person with a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws
governing CDLs, and therefore, Buell " was presumed to know that the
disqualification of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received under
[Title 18]" ); Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 516, 65 P.3d 534, 538
(Ct.App.2003) (rejecting an argument that the police officer was obligated to give
a driver advice regarding all consequences of taking a breath test, not just those
delineated in section 18-8002A). Therefore, Peck's due process rights were not
violated.
Id, page 445.

In its decision, the District Court also cited a case from the state of Wyoming,
noting the similarities of the DUI laws. In Escarcega v. Wyoming Department of
Transportation, 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo 2007) stated:
It would be impractical to require that an arresting officer convey all the
information in both statutory schemes to an arrestee before requesting a specimen
for chemical testing. The implied consent and various driver's license statutes
contain multiple interrelated provisions for penalties that may be heightened or
vary according to the circumstances of each violation. To require a detailed
recitation of all statutory penalties involved in a traffic stop would be a misuse of
law enforcement resources and would not serve the purpose of the implied
consent statutes. The implied consent law was intended as a complement to the
DWUI statute and was designed to facilitate tests for intoxication, not to inhibit
the ability of the state to keep drunk drivers off the road. Chastain, 594 P.2d at
461.

Implied consent is, by nature, implied in law. Merely by choosing to drive
a motor vehicle on the roads of this state, a driver agrees to submit to chemical
testing in the event of his arrest for DWUI. The consequences for refusing a
chemical test are published law, of which every citizen is presumed to have
knowledge. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 609,
112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). The Legislature has created a few limited exceptions to
that rule by requiring that specific warnings be given to drivers in certain
situations before penalties can be imposed. Appellant here was given the precise
warning required by the applicable statutes for a driver stopped in a noncommercial vehicle. He was entitled to no more and no less
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Id., at page 270. In the Peck Decision, the District Court then explained:
The DUI statutory scheme enacted by Idaho's legislature, like that of
Wyoming's, contains "multiple interrelated provision for penalties that may be
heightened or way according to the circumstances of each violation." Idaho Code
Section 49-335, which provides for disqualification and penalties relative to
commercial driver's licenses, is referenced with I.C. § 18-8005 of Idaho's DUI
scheme. However, the legislature chose not to reference I.C. § 49-335 within the
mandatory notice provision provided in I.C. § 18-8002A(2). Idaho legislature set
forth in I.C. § 18-8002A(2) the specific consequences a driver must e informed
about prior to a law enforcement officer's request that a driver perform
evidentiary testing subject to a DUI arrest. While the notification may not cover
all potential consequences of refusing to submit to evidentiary testing or of failing
evidentiary testing, it is all that Idaho's legislature has required, no more and no
less.
R., p.123.

Peck also argued "implied consent" and that "implied consent required notice of
one' rights and the consequences". Petitioner's brief page 8. This is a misstatement of
the doctrine of "implied consent." The concept of implied consent in Idaho is explained
in State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697 (Ct.App. 2001), where the court stated:
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. State v. Rodriguez, 128 Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381
(Ct.App.1996). Idaho's driver licensing scheme provides, as a condition of
possessing a valid license, that a driver of a motor vehicle is deemed to have
consented to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the DUI laws. Idaho Code § 188002(1); McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 187,804 P.2d 911, 916
(Ct.App.1990); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct.
916,920, 74 L.Ed.2d 748,755-56 (1983).

Id., page 699.
In support of his arguments, Peck cited in Matter a/Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947,
895 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1995. That case is distinguishable to the facts and law of this
case. In the Virgil case, the defendant successfully argued that an administrative license
suspension imposed by a magistrate pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002 must be set
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aside because the Twin Falls Police Department's advisory form was defective and did
not comply with the statutory language ofIdaho Code Section 18-8002(3).3
Here, the Court of Appeals has already held that the Advisory Notice given to
Peck at the time of his arrest "specifically provided him notice of the license suspension
and the procedures afforded to him to challenge it." Therefore, unlike the Virgil case, the
Notice given to Peck was not defective.
Although a one year suspension of a CDL is another consequence of both the
refusal to submit to the testing and the failure of the testing, it is not a potential
consequence of which a driver must be informed at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the
failure to inform Peck of the consequences to his CDL is not necessary and the Notice of
Suspension given to Peck complied with Idaho law.

2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:
CDL DISQUALIFICATION IS NOT ARBITRARY
Peck also argues that his substantive due process rights were violated because the
CDL disqualification was arbitrary in that "the underlying conduct has no relation to the
disqualified conduct of operating a commercial motor vehicle." This argument is also
without merit.
In Williams v. lTD, 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 2012), th15e Court of
Appeals addressed a similar argument. In Williams, the petitioner argued that the CDL
disqualification violated principles of Double Jeopardy. In addressing this argument, the
Court dealt with the question as to whether the disqualification was excessive. The Court
stated the following:
3 Idaho Code Section 18-8002(3) has been amended since the Virgil case. The Notice provisions are now
contained 18-8002A.
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Sixth, we must consider whether there is a purpose, other than punishment, that
could be assigned to the lifetime CDL disqualification and whether the
disqualification is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.
As noted above, the purpose ofLC. § 49-335 is to remove problem drivers from
the road through disqualification. Statement of Purpose, SB 1001 (1989). The
right of a citizen to operate a motor vehicle is substantial, but it is also subject to
reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police powers. Talavera,
127 Idaho at 705,905 P.2d at 638. When a person is approved for a CDL, he or
she agrees to abide by certain conditions and regulations. Id. The commercial
driving industry is highly regulated because of the size and weight of commercial
vehicles and the heightened danger they pose to the public should they be
misused. Impaired commercial drivers pose a unique danger to the public because
of the type of vehicles they operate. Therefore, disqualification of a CDL
indicates only that the holder has failed to comply with the agreed conditions, not
that he or she is being punished for a particular act. Id.
The Williams Court went on to hold that "the lifetime disqualification from
driving a commercial vehicle is not disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial
goal of keeping problem drivers with multiple alcohol violations off the roadways."
The holding in Williams is consistent the Court of Appeal holding in Buell where
the Court held a one-year disqualification from driving a commercial vehicle was not
disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial goal of keeping problem drivers off
the roadways. Buell, page 1260.
The District Court reviewed this issue and correctly found that:
Peck failed to demonstrate that I.C. Section 49-335 is arbitrary or that it
bear no rational relationship to any legitimate legislative objective. Therefore,
Petitioner's assertion that his substantive due process rights were violated is
without merit.
Clerk's Record, page 124.

In this case, there was no violation of Peck's right to substantive due process
because the action by ITD is not arbitrary. Because of the size and weight of vehicles
operated by a CDL driver, the industry is highly regulated. As the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held, persons who hold a CDL endorsement agree to abide by certain
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conditions and regulations to obtain and keep the endorsement. The additional regulation
on CDL drivers is directly related to the unique danger to the public because of the types
of vehicles they operate. Thus, CDL drivers are also subject to reasonable regulation by
the State including a one year disqualification for an alcohol violation in a noncommercial vehicle.
V.
NO ATTORNEY FEES

Peck has also requested an award of attorney fees on this appeal. This argument
is also without merit. To award attorney fees, the Court must rule in favor of Peck and
also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. See,

CanallNorcrestlColumbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 671, 39 P.3d
606, 611 (2001). In this matter, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis in law
and in the facts upon which the hearing officer made his decision.

Therefore, since

neither requirement of the statute has been met, the court must decline to award attorney
fees.
VI.
CONCLUSION

ITD respectfully requests that the court uphold the decision of the District Court
and of the hearing officer which sustained CDL disqualification. ITD also requested the
court remand the matter to the District Court to vacate the stay of the CDL
disqualification.

16

Dated August 13,2013.
Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the BRIEF was transmitted, August 13,
2013 by the following method, to:
JOHN A. FINNEY
Attorney at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint,ID 83864
Fax: 208 263-8211

Fax
V" US Mail

Ji!J00~ k ~vtcL~
Susan K. Servick

17

